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Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or
How Charles Black Might Have Thought About
Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional
Timidity
MICHAEL C. DoRF*
INTRODUCTION
As a constitutional stylist, Charles Black belongs in the pantheon with
Justices Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, and Jackson. His writing was invariably
crisp, clear, and elegant. Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law is
certainly no exception to this rule.1 And yet, the book is easily misread. The
signal contribution of Structure and Relationship is its identification of a
method of constitutional interpretation in which the reader draws inferences
from the relationship among the structures of government-such as Congress,
the Presidency, and the states. Nonetheless, as I explain in Part I of this essay,
Black is sometimes read simply as a holist, as one who urges attention to the
entirety of the Constitution rather than to isolated clauses.
Why, given the lucidity of Black's prose, would he be so grossly misread? In
Part II, I explain that the structural method that Black advocated places a great
deal of power in the hands of those who would employ it. Scholars and judges
justifiably worry that the structural method may become nothing more than a
mask for judicial usurpation of functions best left to the political process.
Interpretive holism hews closer to constitutional text than Black's structural
method. Thus, by attributing interpretive holism to Black, judges and scholars
who worry about the courts' legitimacy pay Black homage without stirring their
anxieties about usurpation.
Such anxieties have their place, but Black's work need not necessarily stir
them up. Although Black illustrated his structural method with Supreme
Court cases, the method was not designed exclusively for judges. Black
wrote and cared a great deal about constitutional interpretation outside of
the courts, especially in confrontations between Congress and the Presi-
dent.2 In this political context, the structural method operates without
* Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This essay originated in
oral comments delivered in response to a paper presented by Stephen Carter at Yale Law School on
March 28, 2003, as part of the Charles Black Memorial Colloquia. I thank Professor Carter for calling
my attention to Charles Black's work on congressional acquiescence in presidential power, discussed at
some length here. Thanks also to Akhil Amar, Richard Briffault, Samuel Issacharoff, Amelia Simpson,
and Adrienne Stone for helpful conversations, to William Eskridge and Vicki Jackson for co-organizing
the colloquia, to Akiva Goldfarb and Zachary Tripp for excellent research assistance, and to Charles
Black for inspiration.
1. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
2. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974).
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raising the specter of judicial usurpation. I argue in Part III that Black's
structural method can also be extended and applied to illuminate a puzzle
that Black himself remarked upon: Given that Congress has more formal
power than the President, why does Congress so rarely stand up to the
President? 3 Whereas Black reasoned from the relationships among the
institutions the Constitution creates and recognizes, I suggest in Part III that
the Constitution sometimes plays a related but distinct role: It calls into
existence some institutions. In particular, the Constitution calls into exis-
tence political parties and with them the practice of party loyalty that makes
members of Congress unlikely to challenge Presidents of their own party.
Black's structural method is not merely an explanatory device, and so, in
Part IV, I ask whether any normative conclusions follow from the observa-
tion that political parties are at least a quasi-constitutional feature of our
system of government. I argue that the two-party system as we know it is a
double-edged sword. As I have just noted, political parties divert loyalty
away from institutions like Congress, thereby undermining the constitu-
tional system of separation of powers. On the other hand, by aggregating
interests on a national scale, the two major political parties serve the same
constitutional function that James Madison claimed for the "extended Repub-
lic" in The Federalist No. 10: they domesticate and thus control the vice of
faction.
I conclude Part IV by asking how these competing constitutional values
might be traded off against one another in the concrete context of campaign
finance regulation. Posing the question as one for the courts, I tentatively argue
that campaign finance regulation has appropriately been upheld in part because
(rather than in spite) of the fact that it may weaken the two-party system. The
argument is not entirely persuasive, however, because here, as elsewhere, the
structural method is open-ended. Its great virtue, as Black himself argued, is
that it focuses attention on the questions that really matter, but only we-by
which I mean judges, politicians, and interested citizens--can decide how to
resolve those questions.
I. MISREADING THE STRUCTURAL METHOD AS INTERPRETIVE HOLISM
This Part distinguishes Black's structural method from interpretive holism. I
must begin, however, by acknowledging that passages of Structure and Relation-
ship appear to sound in interpretive holism. Black states his thesis thus:
[I]n dealing with questions of constitutional law, we [by which Black means
the Supreme Court and Court-focused commentators] have preferred the
method of purported explication or exegesis of the particular textual passage
considered as a directive of action, as opposed to the method of inference
3. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13 (1974).
[Vol. 92:833
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from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts
or in some principal part.4
This passage, and the book more generally, could thus be (mis)taken to espouse
a method of holistic interpretation of the Constitution. The message would go
something like this: Don't just read each clause in isolation; see the document
as a whole; understand how its various provisions fit together
I have no quarrel with interpretive holism. 5 Indeed, I doubt that even self-
described textualists such as Justice Scalia have any quarrel with holism. It is,
after all, a conventional principle of textual construction that words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their context. 6 To use an example provided by
Professor Amar-himself an interpretive holist who greatly admires Charles
Black 7-the placement of the constitutional provision goveming suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Article dealing with Congress
creates a rebuttable presumption that Congress, rather than the President, has
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ.8 This sort of holism-as-
sophisticated-textualism makes a great deal of common sense, and Charles
Black certainly believed in common sense. 9
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to read Black's Structure and Relationship
as principally addressed to the structure of the Constitution and the relationship
among its various provisions.' The Structure in which Black was most inter-
4. BLACK, supra note 1, at 7.
5. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 21-23 (1991)
(warning against "dis-integration" in constitutional interpretation); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 953 (2002) (employing "holistic methods ... [that] share the
premise that the meaning of the constitutional text is not exhausted by whatever concepts an isolated
phrase connotes to the reader [because] further guidance can often be gleaned from the balance of the
constitutional text").
6. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37 ("In
textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect
nit-picking detail ....").
7. For Professor Amar's version of holism, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV.
747 (1999). For an example of his admiration for Black, see Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND.
L.J. 671, 699 n.104 (2002) (acknowledging a debt to Black, who "preached holism, although Black
explicitly defined his brand of 'structural' interpretation in contradistinction to textualism").
8. See Amar, Architexture, supra note 7, at 697-98. Amar concludes that in this instance the
presumption is rebutted by other factors. See id. at 698.
9. "Use your common sense" is an apt summary of Black's account of Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421 (1959).
10. For examples of (otherwise excellent) works that cite Black's Structure and Relationship as
presenting an argument for holistic interpretation, see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The
Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 141 n.465 (1998) (describing
Structure and Relationship as "arguing that the Constitution should be read holistically, not as sequence
of discrete provisions"); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpreta-
tion of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1181 n.4 (1987) (attributing to Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 217 (1980), the view that
Structure and Relationship counsels a methodology of "comparing structural relationships between
clauses of the original constitutional document to discover commonalities of approach and usage, as
2004]
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ested is the structure of the government of the United States of America. The
Relationship is the relationship of its component parts: the federal government;
the state governments; citizens; aliens; local officials; Congress; the President;
the Supreme Court; and so forth.
Even the title of this colloquium reflects the misreading-or misemphasis-I
have just noted. Our panel is called Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Interpretation, whereas Black's book was titled Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law. That is a subtle but important difference. Constitutional
interpretation suggests a focus on the Constitution as an interpretive object.
Constitutional law, by contrast, suggests a wider angle of view: Parts of
constitutional law are drawn from the Constitution's text-whether interpreted
clause-by-clause or holistically-but other parts, Black insists, emerge out of
the institutions the Constitution creates or recognizes, rather than directly from
the text."
A few examples suffice to show that interpretive holism is not the main theme
in Structure and Relationship. The book begins with a discussion of Carrington
v. Rash, which held that El Paso County, Texas, could not deny the franchise to
a resident on the ground that he was a member of the armed services who
resided outside of El Paso when he enlisted in the army. 12 The case was decided
on equal protection grounds, 13 but, Black argues, it would have been better
justified using the structural method, namely by recognizing-as a matter of the
relation among citizens, the federal government, and states-"that no state may
annex any disadvantage simply and solely to the performance of a federal
well as structures and relationships within the document," although Brest appears not to view Black's
work that way at the cited page); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1240 n.40 (1987) (citing Structure and
Relationship in support of the legitimacy of deriving meaning "from the structure and relationship of
terms, limits, and rights in the text"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce
Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1189 n.16 (2003) (describing Structure and
Relationship as "recommending that courts should generally infer principles from the Constitution's
structure, not from particular textual provisions"); Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman
Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1462 n.20 (2001) (labeling
Structure and Relationship "the best work on structuralist interpretative practice," which "emphasizes
construing the various provisions of the Constitution so that they 'fit,' or remain consistent with the
organic whole of the text"). Professor Amar does not mistake Black's structuralism for his own holism.
See Amar, Architexture, supra note 7, at 699 n.104; Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 7, at 790,
797 n.197. However, as a holist who counts Black as one of his heroes, Amar may invite all but the
most careful readers of his work to conflate Black's methodology with his own. See Steven G.
Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2281 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECON SRUCION (1998)) ("Professor Amar's analysis brilliantly illustrates the technique
that he has called 'intratextualism' ... and that Charles Black has called reasoning by structure and
relationship.").
11. As one of the principal organizers of the Charles Black Memorial Colloquia, I bear substantial
responsibility for the title of the conference, but I vociferously deny having (consciously) chosen the
title for the purpose of facilitating my own critique thereof.
12. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
13. See id. at 96 (invalidating "invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
[Vol. 92:833
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duty."' 14 In his discussion of Carrington, the only constitutional provision Black
even mentions is the Fourteenth Amendment, and then only to argue that it is
superfluous to the proper grounds for the decision. 15 Black does not juxtapose
constitutional provisions or in any way attend to the structure of the Constitu-
tion; he infers his constitutional rule of law from what he takes to be the most
productive way of organizing relations among constitutionally created and
recognized actors, not constitutional clauses.
The proof of the pudding is in Black's discussion of McCulloch v. Mary-
land.'6 A structuralism that paid principal attention to the structure of the
Constitution would invoke John Marshall's argument concerning the placement
of the Necessary and Proper Clause "among the powers of Congress, not among
the limitations on those powers."' 7 This argument shows that Marshall himself
paid close attention to what a holist like Professor Amar would call the
"architexture" of the Constitution-the structure of the document and the
relationship of its clauses to one another. Yet that sort of structure and that kind
of relationship do not especially interest Professor Black. His exegesis of
McCulloch pays far greater attention to the "relational proprieties between the
national government and the government of the states."' 8 Black concedes that
the decision could be rooted in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI if one
needed a textual hook, but he ascribes the real, proper ground of decision to
"reasoning from the total structure which the text has created."' 9 Again, note
that the structure that interests Black is not the structure of the Constitution as a
document; it is the structure of institutions the document creates.
Let me give one more example of the difference between Black's institutional-
ism and interpretive holism. Much of the second of the three lectures that
comprise Structure and Relationship20 argues that protection of freedom of
expression against state interference would be better accomplished as an infer-
ence from the relationship of citizens to their government than-as per standard
doctrine-via the Fourteenth Amendment's "incorporation" of the First Amend-
ment. 2' Black invites a thought experiment in which there were no Fourteenth
Amendment.22 Nonetheless, and even assuming that Barron v. Baltimore23 were
good law, he says that surely a principle of free expression would bind the
states. He asks: "[I1s it not an inference from structure and relation, just as sure
as any constitutional inference could be, that no state could constitutionally
14. BLACK, supra note 1, at 11.
15. See id. at 12.
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
17. Id. at 419.
18. BLACK, supra note 1, at 15.
19. Id.
20. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Particular Structural Considerations in Constitutional Law, in
BLACK, supra note 1, at 33-66.
21. See id. at 33-51.
22. Id. at 33-34.
23. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding the original Bill of Rights inapplicable to the states).
2004]
HeinOnline -- 92 Geo. L.J. 836 2003-20042
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
make criminal the signing and transmittal of any petition to Congress? '24 He
continues that "such a state law would" be invalid because it would "interfere[]
with a transaction which is a part of the working of the federal government. 25
Black does not need the Fourteenth or the First Amendment for this conclusion;
it flows, in his view, from the relations of citizens to the state and federal
governments. The federal government has broad powers; citizens elect members
of Congress; therefore, citizens need to be free to discuss all the issues that may
be relevant to matters of potential federal legislation. Accordingly, state offi-
cials, who also have some constitutionally-assigned federal functions, cannot
constitutionally interfere with communication between citizens and the federal
government, or for that matter, communications among citizens. Then, from the
core of petitions to Congress, Black expands outward to a general right of
communication that "eventuate[s] in the conclusion that most serious public
discussion of political issues is really a part, at least in one aspect, of the process
of national government, and hence ought to be invulnerable to state attack.",26
II. THE OPEN-ENDEDNESS OF THE STRUCTURAL METHOD
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law has been and continues to
be an extremely influential book. In the sense that constitutional lawyers know
better than to read the Constitution one provision at a time, we are all structural-
ists now. Nonetheless, the particular structural method that Black championed-
drawing inferences from the structures of government rather than from the
structure of the constitutional text-remains under-utilized. Why?
The answer, I think, is that for a constitutional regime still haunted by the
ghost of Lochner27 and fearful, by turns, of both politically conservative and
politically liberal overreaching by the judiciary, inference from institutional
structures appears to be too open-ended a methodology. Arguments grounded in
the text and structure of the Constitution seem more determinate.
Black had a partial response to the charge of judicial usurpation. As he
emphasized in the third lecture of Structure and Relationship, most of the
theoretical fuss about judicial review concerns the paradigm of Marbury v.
Madison,29 in which the Court substitutes its constitutional views for those of
Congress.3 ° In practice, however, the constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court that trigger the most vociferous opposition do not typically pit the federal
24. BLACK, supra note 1, at 40.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 44-45.
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state maximum-hours law violated right
to freedom of contract entailed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
28. Charles L. Black, Jr., Constitutional Structure and Judicial Review, in BLACK, supra note 1, at
67-98.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. See BLACK, supra note 1, at 70-73.
[Vol. 92:833
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judiciary against the national legislature. 31 To be sure, even state and local
elected officials are more politically accountable than the Court; therefore, a
version of the countermajoritarian difficulty 32 still arises when the Court nulli-
fies their decisions. But one important function of a national constitution is to
settle certain issues as a matter of national policy, and therefore any national
legal system in which the constitution is more than hortatory would provide for
the occasional displacement of some decisions as inconsistent with the constitu-
tion. If the Supreme Court lacked the power of constitutional review, such
power might well be vested in Congress. What distinguishes the Marbury
paradigm from judicial review of actors other than Congress is that review of
congressional acts cannot be justified on the ground that the Constitution
demands some measure of national uniformity. The point was put with character-
istic pith by Justice Holmes, who wrote: "I do not think the United States would
come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several States."33
Black's distinction between judicial review of acts of Congress and judicial
review of the actions of other institutions was a fair response when he delivered
the lectures comprising Structure and Relationship. As Professor Amar has
noted, at that time the Warren Court was striking down roughly one federal
statute per year.34 By contrast, the current Rehnquist Court strikes down about
four federal statutes per year,35 including, just since 1997, provisions of four
federal civil rights laws.36 Some of those decisions, as well as other rulings
31. Many of the most controversial exercises of the power of judicial review involve the constitution-
ality of state statutes. For example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), invalidated a Texas statute,
although even then, the case was nominally an action filed against a county district attorney. See id. at
120. Likewise, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the plaintiffs challenged, inter
alia, a policy of intentional racial segregation in public schools that had been adopted by the Topeka
Board of Education pursuant to a state statute that did not require such segregation. See id. at 486 n. I.
Whatever else might be said in favor of judicial restraint, one cannot plausibly argue that the Topeka
Board of Education is a co-equal constitutional actor with the Supreme Court of the United States.
32. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
33. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, LAW AND THE COURT, reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291,
295-96 (1920).
34. See Amar, Architexture, supra note 7, at 678.
35. See id.
36. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating provision entitling plaintiffs to
sue states for damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating provision entitling plaintiffs to sue states for damages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to suits against state though perhaps not
federal actors). The tide may be turning, however. For two rare instances of the Court sustaining
congressional power to enact civil rights remedies against the states that provide greater protection than
the Court's own jurisprudence, see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (permitting suits against
states to enforce the public access provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act insofar as they
implicate the fundamental right of court access); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
2004]
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invalidating congressional action, rest on a principle of state sovereign immu-
nity that is nowhere expressly stated in the Constitution-indeed, that is ruled
out by conventional clause-by-clause interpretive analysis-but which the Court
justifies by what I must admit is a form of Blackian structuralism. Here is how
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,3 7
summarizes the grounds for the inference of state sovereign immunity:
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the
Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition ... which it confirms. That presupposition ... has two parts:
first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second,
that [i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent.
38
In other words, don't interpret the Eleventh Amendment as a stand-alone
provision. Look at the larger relationships between citizens, states, and the
federal government. And when you do, the Court says, you will find that the
relationship of sovereign states to citizens requires that the former be immune to
suit by the latter, absent the state's consent or congressional authorization under
a constitutional provision-such as one of the Reconstruction Amendments 39-
that operates as an exception to the background structure of the relevant
institutions. That is a structuralist move of the sort Black championed. n
I do not say, of course, that the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is
especially wise. I think it is not. And, of course, any interpretive methodology
can be misused, so we should not tax Black's structuralism with the worst uses
to which it is put. There remains, however, the question of whether structural-
ism is especially susceptible of abuse. This question boils down to whether
structuralism is any less determinate than its rivals because the more open-
ended an interpretive methodology, the easier it is to justify bad (as well as
good) decisions using that methodology.
Black himself pretty clearly thought that structuralism was no more indetermi-
nate than any of the alternatives. He believed that the structural method was at
least as determinate as nominally textual interpretation of such open-ended
(2003) (sustaining provision entitling plaintiffs to sue states for damages under the Family and Medical
Leave Act).
37. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
38. Id. at 54 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
39. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
40. It could be argued that the current Court would not endorse the structuralist method on display in
its Eleventh Amendment cases if the question were to arise as one of first impression, but is simply
applying the principle established in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 1 find this view implausible
given the current Court's willingness to extend the immunity principle of Hans beyond the federal
courts to state courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and federal agencies, see Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
[Vol. 92:833
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provisions as "due process of law."'4 1 Moreover, Black thought that structural
interpretation had the further virtue of focusing discussion on the real stakes in
constitutional adjudication:
We will have to deal with policy and not with grammar. I am not suggesting
that grammar can be sidestepped, or that policy can legitimately be the whole
of law. I am only saying that where a fairly available method of legal
reasoning, by its very nature, leads directly to the discussion of practical
rightness, that method should be used whenever possible.42
Let us pause a moment over what might be regarded as the perfunctory
caveat in Professor Black's credo: Black says that structural reasoning should be
used "whenever possible," thereby acknowledging that it is meant to supple-
ment rather than supplant attention to individual snippets of text. He was, to use
the vocabulary of Philip Bobbitt, proposing that we recognize another "modal-
ity" of constitutional argument, 43 not that we do away with the existing ones.
Moreover, he thought that decisions reached via the structural method should be
examined for consistency with text, doctrine, and so forth.
44
Despite Black's defense of structuralism, it remains vulnerable to the
charge of indeterminacy, which may explain the greater emphasis on text
and other sources of meaning that one sees in some of Black's followers
than one finds in Black's work itself.45 Indeed, those of us who are broadly
sympathetic to the values that Charles Black promoted-that you might say
he embodied-should be careful not to pass over the written constitutional
text too quickly in our enthusiasm for structure and relationship. The
reasons have as much to do with protection of those values as they do with
the authority of written text.
At least with respect to cases involving individual rights, the current align-
ment of political and jurisprudential viewpoints still associates strong judicial
protection of rights with open-ended methods of interpretation such as structural-
ism, and weak rights with closer textual analysis. Social conservatives denounce
liberal judicial activism on the ground that it is usurpation to a much greater
extent than civil libertarians denounce conservative judicial activism on that
ground. But the association of text-focused interpretation and political conserva-
41. BLACK, supra note 1, at 49.
42. Id. at 23.
43. See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 6-8 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 11-22 (1991).
44. See BLACK, supra note I, at 31 ("There is ... a close and perpetual interworking between the
textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned
are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn from them must surely be controlled by the
text."); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (explaining how text, doctrine, and other sources of constitutional
meaning should be integrated).
45. See supra note 10.
2004]
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tism is largely an accident of the last three decades. The most celebrated
textualist Supreme Court Justice is not Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas, but
Hugo Black-who sought to use the Bill of Rights as a constraint on the
meaning of the open-ended Due Process Clause not simply because he believed
in constraining judges, but also because he believed that the provisions of the
actual Bill of Rights that we are lucky enough to have, do a pretty good job of
protecting the liberties essential to protecting human flourishing against govern-
ment overreaching.46
Let me give an example from a foreign legal system. It happens that the
thought experiment proposed by Professor Black was later actually carried out
in Australia. The Australian Constitution lacks a bill of rights, but in 1992 the
High Court of Australia nonetheless inferred a principle of freedom of speech
from the system of representative government set forth in the constitution.47 A
subsequent decision indicated that the free speech principle would be inter-
preted robustly, locating a somewhat modified version of the test set forth in
New York Times v. Sullivan48 in the Australian constitutional structure. 49 How-
ever, after an intervening change of personnel, the High Court cut back on its
free speech jurisprudence, declaring the following:
[T]he Constitution gives effect to the institution of "representative govern-
ment" only to the extent that the text and structure of the Constitution
establish it .... Under the Constitution, the relevant question is not, "What is
required by representative and responsible government?" It is, "What do the
terms and structure of the Constitution prohibit, authorise or require?"
To the extent that the requirement of freedom of communication is an
implication drawn from [particular sections] of the Constitution, the implica-
tion can validly extend only so far as is necessary to give effect to these
50sections.
Now, one can fairly criticize the High Court of Australia for its retrenchment
on the ground that it misapplied, or failed to apply, Professor Black's structural
method. The whole point of structural inference, after all, is to look beyond
what is strictly necessary to give effect to particular bits of constitutional
46. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and
Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 56 (1994) ("Justice Black favored constitutional literalism and formalism as
a way of eliminating judicial activism in economic due process cases. But, he also advocated bold
judicial enforcement of the Constitution's explicit guarantees" because he thought absolute limits were
necessary "to protect the American people from certain 'ancient evils."') (quoting Hugo L. Black, The
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960)).
47. See Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106;
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. See Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104.
50. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 566-67.
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language.51 But such criticism misses the point, I think. In our legal culture-by
which I mean at least the legal culture of the common-law countries and
probably something substantially broader-interpretive arguments unmoored
from text are always vulnerable to being attacked as illegitimate.52 It is possible,
of course, that a newly conservative High Court of Australia would have found
a way to retrench on free-speech-protective decisions even if the Australian
Constitution contained an express provision guaranteeing a right of free speech;
however, it would have had a more difficult time justifying such a maneuver
and, for that reason, we might think that free speech and other values will, on
average, do better if the courts are asked to protect them by express invitation
rather than as a matter of structural inference.
To return from the antipodes to our immediate situation, if structuralism in
the absence of clear textual warrant is always vulnerable to retrenchment,
structuralism that is overly freewheeling poses dangers for textual entrench-
ment. In the current political climate, the gravest governmental threat to civil
liberties comes from policies such as detention, without trial or even any serious
judicial scrutiny, of persons-including citizens-that the executive branch
determines to be enemy combatants, and like measures justified in the name of
public safety. Such measures can only be squared with the Constitution by the
sort of creative construction that textualists purport to abjure.53
But a version of structuralism that is unconcerned with constitutional text
makes such creativity seem more plausible. For if inferences from structure
and relationship can be used to recognize rights that are not clearly spelled
out in the constitutional text, then it is hard to see why such inferences
cannot also be used to narrow the scope of, or even eviscerate, what would
otherwise be at least prima facie protections for civil and political rights.54
"The Constitution is not a suicide pact" 55 is both a truism thought to justify
nearly anything our government plans to do in the name of combating
terrorism and a structural principle.
5 1. For a criticism generally along these lines, see Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text
and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication, 23 MELB. U. L. REV.
668 (1999).
52. Black would have likely replied that good structural arguments are never completely unmoored
from the text, because the structures and relationships derive from the text. See BLACK, supra note 1, at
31. To the extent that structuralism is a distinct methodology from textual interpretation, however,
arguments rooted in structure and relationship as such must count as, at best, only very loosely tethered
to text.
53. Accordingly, self-described textualist Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Stevens) went furthest in
rejecting the executive claim that a U.S. citizen could be held indefinitely as an "enemy combatant" in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). Although the Court's other textualist, Justice Thomas, was
the only Justice willing to sustain the claim of executive power, his dissent repeatedly invokes
"principles of constitutional structure" and the "structural advantages" of Presidential authority rather
than the Constitution's text. See id. at 2674, 2675 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54. See SCALIA, supra note 6, at 42-44.
55. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[W]hile the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.").
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Almost any draconian measure can be defended by the following structuralist
syllogism: (1) The Constitution creates a federal government and recognizes
state governments that are meant to endure for the benefit of, in the words of the
Preamble, "our Posterity;" (2) Draconian measure X is necessary to prevent a
catastrophe that would undermine the nation; (3) Therefore, draconian measure
X must be permissible notwithstanding constitutional language that seemingly
blocks it. If one thinks that over the course of history, judges are far more likely
to perceive a danger of type X where there is none than to discount a real X-type
danger, and if one thinks that constitutions are designed to protect against just
this tendency, 56 then one will be skeptical of doctrines and interpretive methods
that leave judges with a great deal of room to rationalize their fears. And there is
reason to think that the structural method as Professor Black conceived it does
just that.
In the end, therefore, it is not especially surprising that Black's method of
inference from the structures and relationships created and recognized by the
Constitution should have been conflated with a method that infers rules of law
from the structures and relationships found in the constitutional text. For
without something like this conflation, the structural method may be danger-
ously open-ended-at least when it is seen as a method to be used by judges
performing the task of judicial review.
III. THE CAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
Given its open-endedness, Professor Black's structural method may be most
relevant to nonjudicial actors who must interpret the Constitution, which was a
subject about which Black himself cared deeply. In particular, in a 1974 paper,
The Working Balance of the American Political Departments,57 Black explains
how the Constitution allocates to Congress ample tools to resist presidential
policymaking. Given that fact, why does Congress never seem to utilize these
tools? A political scientist might attempt to answer such a question by explain-
ing the growth in the administrative state, and the political scientist would be
right of course. But there may be a further, constitutional, dimension to the
phenomenon. This Part proposes that we follow Charles Black's lead in taking
constitutional structure seriously, even while looking beyond the four corners of
the Constitution. In doing so, we may find an answer to the puzzle of the
acquiescent Congress in a set of institutions-political parties-that the Consti-
tution implicitly calls into existence.
Let us begin with the political scientist's-or more precisely, the public
choice theorist's-explanation for congressional acquiescence in the expansion
of presidential power. Public choice theory teaches that individual members of
Congress care about getting re-elected, rather than advancing the public good or
56. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLuM. L. REV.
449,449-50 (1985).
57. Black, supra note 3.
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even maximizing the power of Congress as an institution.58 Further, members of
Congress can take credit for solving social problems-and thus look good to
their constituents-without putting themselves on the hook for tough policy
tradeoffs, by delegating broad power to the Executive; thus, the incentive
structure strongly disfavors close congressional supervision of the President's
policymaking.
I do not so much want to disagree with this account as I want to supplement it
with a constitutional story, for we can gain some further traction on the
phenomenon of congressional acquiescence to presidential power by extending
Professor Black's structural method. Where others saw only the constitutional
text, Black saw the institutions created or recognized by the Constitution.
Suppose that we go one step further still and ask about institutions that are in
some sense necessitated by the Constitution, though nowhere mentioned in it? I
have in mind political parties, and, although I shall not discuss them here, other
civil society institutions.
Consider the relatively uncontroversial proposition that political parties play
a central role in the actual operation of American government as we know it,59
despite the fact that the Constitution is blind to their existence. That blindness,
of course, is no accident. The Federalist No. 10 is only the most famous
statement of the Framers' antipathy to political factions, which they associated
with political parties. 60 Madison was hardly alone in his fear of factionalism.
6
'
And, as I now briefly explain, we find evidence of the Framers' fears in The
Federalist and the Constitution itself, which manifests concern with factionalism
along at least four dimensions: among religious sects; between debtors and creditors;
between slave states and free states; and between small states and large states.
58. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation
Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 621-22 (2003) (explaining that "public choice,
which is the rational actor theory's approach to politics ... [posits] that legislators and the chief
executive will try to maximize their chances of being re-elected"). For a useful critical account of
public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991). The seminal public choice works include ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d
ed. 1989); and MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
59. See generally Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 100 COLUM L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that political parties form an unintended part of the
constitutionally structured political safeguards of federalism); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federal-
ism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994) (arguing that political parties serve as natural brokers between state
and federal government).
60. The Federalist No. /0 itself sometimes uses the term "party" in the sense of political party as a
synonym for "faction." See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (discussing "the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of Govern-
ment"); id. at 60 (noting the ability of "a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice" in
apportioning taxes).
61. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776 -1787, at 57-59
(1969) (arguing that most of the Framers' generation conceived of factionalism as "dangerous and
destructive, arising from false ambition, avarice, or revenge") (internal quotations omitted).
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The Federalist No. 10 describes the vice of factional fighting along religious
lines.62 Although Madison's views (along with those of his fellow Virginian
Thomas Jefferson) were probably at the extreme end of secularist sentiment of
the day,63 the Federal Constitution, with its prohibition on religious tests and a
national established religion, was in its time and remains today one of the most
secular in the world. And that is so despite-or perhaps because of-the fact
that Americans tend to be more religious than citizens of other Western democra-
cies. 64
Next, consider economic factionalism. If Madison went further than his
fellow Framers in wishing to keep religion out of government, the fear of
economic populism was widely shared among his class. The elite worried that
absent sufficient safeguards, popular rule would generate "a rage for paper
money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any
other improper or wicked project. ' 66
For Madison, if not for others,6 7 the sheer size of the new Republic was
an important factor in combating economic populism, but even he did not
rely on size alone. Fearing that state legislatures would fall into the hands of
the debtor class, the Framers assigned the power to coin money exclusively
to the federal government. 68 They hoped thereby to block easy-money,
inflationary policies that would benefit debtors at the expense of creditors;
monetary policy would be in the hands of the relatively aristocratic federal
government and not the relatively populist states.69 Moreover, although
Madison failed in his objective of affording the national legislature a power
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 60, at 64 ("[A] religious sect, may degenerate into a
[local or regional] political faction ....").
63. See Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 791 (2002).
64. See The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Global Attitudes: 44-Nation
Major Survey (2002) (showing, inter alia, that only forty percent of American respondents
agreed that it is "not necessary to believe in God to be moral and have good values," whereas
the lowest response of any other industrialized democracy was sixty-six percent for Japan
and Germany), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185topline.pdf (last visited May 8,
2004).
65. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (The Free Press 1965) (1913) (describing the Constitutional Convention as essentially
an aristocratic counterrevolution against the populism of the previous decade and a half); WooD, supra
note 61 at 403-09.
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 60, at 65.
67. Professor Kramer has argued that James Madison's argument for the extended Republic, set forth
in his Vices Memo and The Federalist No. 10, was not widely appreciated in its day. Larry Kramer,
Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L. REV. 611, 637-71 (1999). That may be, but Kramer does not deny
that the founding generation broadly shared Madison's antipathy to political factions. What they may
have misunderstood was Madison's prescribed remedy, not the nature of the illness.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To... coin money ...."); id. § 10
("No State shall ... coin Money ....").
69. Charles Beard attributes such motives to the Convention generally. See BEARD, supra note 65.
Less controversially, Wood attributes these motives at least to the Federalists. See WOOD, supra note 61,
at 403-09, 483-99.
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to veto all state legislation,7 ° the supremacy of federal law, along with the
Marshall Court's broad interpretation of federal power (ironically contested
by Madison himself in his later, Jeffersonian Republican phase7 1), assured
the near-equivalent: The federal government would have and has had the
power to regulate the national economy and to displace most state regulatory
efforts deemed unduly intrusive.
The original Constitution included parallel mechanisms to combat factional-
ism along the other dimensions mentioned above. On the slave question, this
meant preventing an anti-slavery majority from "tyrannizing" slaveholders by
turning the federal government against the peculiar institution. The Fugitive
Slave Clause, the preservation of the slave trade through 1808, the three-fifths
compromise, and in one way or another, virtually every other feature of the
federal government, all would serve to frustrate an abolitionist faction should it
manage to come to power.
72
Finally, the compromise between large and small states ensured the preserva-
tion of the status quo even against "factions" that comprise a substantial
majority of the population. The Constitution permanently preserves small states'
suffrage in the Senate, disproportionately values their electoral votes in Presiden-
tial elections, and places them on an equal footing with large states in the
ratification of constitutional amendments.73
70. Madison sought a "national negative." See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 9 APR- 1786-24 MAY 1787, at 317-18 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]; Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 368, 370; Letter from James Madison to George
Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 382, 383-84.
71. See CLINTON RossrrER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENnON 308-09 (1968) (relating that Hamilton's
proposal to create what became the First Bank of the United States "tormented Madison," who believed
that "incorporation could be justified only on an interpretation of the authority of Congress that ...
leveled all the barriers which limit the power of the general government, and protect those of the state
governments") (internal quotations omitted). After Madison became president, he "expressly dis-
claimed the view, so tenaciously advocated by himself twenty-three years earlier, that the Bank was
unconstitutional." Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 286-87 (1997).
72. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death,
in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 219-23
(Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (Fugitive Slave Clause); id. at 210-18 (1808 Preservation Clause);
id. at 196-97 (three-fifths compromise).
73. The Framers' efforts to protect the interests of small states have continuing ramifications. As is
well-known, in the 2000 Presidential election, Al Gore won the popular vote while losing the electoral
vote. Less well-known is the fact that the total population of the states Gore won also exceeded the total
population of the states George W. Bush won--even counting Florida in the Bush column. Bush won
thirty states and 271 electoral college votes from 50,456,002 voters in states with a combined
population of 140,626,203. Gore won twenty states and the District of Columbia, and thus 266 electoral
college votes from 50,999,897 voters in states with a combined population of 140,795,703. For
electoral data, see Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results,
available at http:l/www.fec.govlpubrecl2000presgeresults.htm (last visited May 8, 2004). For popula-
tion data, see U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Table GCT-PH I -R, Population, Housing
Units, Area, and Density, available at http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/us.html (last visited
July 16, 2004).
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When the Framers expressed hostility to political parties, they were voicing
opposition to factionalism along the lines of quasi-permanent interest groups
such as religions, classes, and states.74 They did not anticipate the ideological
umbrella parties that would eventually come into being, and that failure ren-
dered the Constitution incompatible with the political system to which it gave
birth. In only the second contested Presidential election, the system nearly
collapsed.75 The Twelfth Amendment patched things up, but awkwardly, so that
we have succession crises roughly once a century.76 Had the Supreme Court not
resolved Bush v. Gore77 as it did, and had Florida sent two competing slates of
electors to Washington, we might well have had a Republican President (be-
cause Republican state delegations outnumbered Democratic state delegations
in the House of Representatives, which chooses the President if there is no
electoral majority 78) and a Democratic Vice President (because Democrats at
the time outnumbered Republicans in the Senate, which chooses the Vice
President in these circumstances 79). The Electoral Count Act of 188780 purports
to avoid some of these difficulties, but its constitutionality is hardly clear-cut. 8 '
Despite the Constitution's failure to provide for clear rules-or indeed any
rules-about the interaction of political parties with the apparatus of govern-
ment, the Black-inspired point I wish to emphasize here is that the Constitution
nonetheless calls parties into existence. In any but the most trivially small
polity, politics is impossible without organizations. The Constitution created a
complex governmental system in which the enactment of legislation requires
74. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 60, at 57 (defining "faction" as "a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community").
75. George Washington faced no real opposition in 1788 and 1792. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE
ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at
38, 57 (1994) (noting that the 1788 election was unanimous in the electoral college and that the 1792
election was also essentially uncontested). The second contested Presidential election took place in
1800, and the rise of parties exposed a defect in the original Constitution, which permitted each elector
to cast two votes. Contrary to the Framers' original expectations, each of the major parties ran a
Presidential and a Vice Presidential candidate, and each elector of the victorious Democratic-
Republican Party cast one vote for Thomas Jefferson and one for Aaron Burr. The tie was only broken
after thirty-six ballots cast in the House of Representatives. See generally id. at 96-101; David P.
Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 39 (2001).
76. In addition to the Presidential election of 1800, the elections of 1876 and 2000 yielded deadlocks
that had to be resolved by extraordinary intervention-a special commission in the former instance and
a decision of the Supreme Court in the latter. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); KEITH
IAN POLAKOFF, THE POLITICS OF INERTIA: THE ELECTION OF 1876 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 203
(1973).
77. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
79. Id.
80. 24 Stat. 373 (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-7, 15-18 (2000)).
81. The Act sets forth various procedures, including a safe harbor that purports to insulate from
review in Congress the electoral count of a state complying with a deadline set forth in the Act. See 3
U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Insofar as that procedure imposes constraints on Congress not found in Article 11 or
the Twelfth Amendment, its constitutionality is open to question.
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joint action by the President, the House, and the Senate, and where national
politics also gives a substantial role to the states in the operation of the federal
government.82 As a practical matter, in order for the government to function,
institutions for coordinating political action needed to arise.83 To be sure, we
can imagine politics organized by institutions other than political parties such as
churches, labor unions, and other civil society institutions. But political parties
that were custom-built to address a full range of political issues obviously had
an advantage over these other institutions designed primarily to serve other
purposes.
What sort of party politics did the Constitution call into existence? Although
our constitutional history might have unfolded differently, at least since 1842,
when the pattern of single-member geographical districts became more or less
fixed,84 the two-party system has been all but guaranteed. Duverger's Law
entails two and essentially only two parties in each district, 85 and while in
principle those two parties could be different in different states, in practice the
82. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-52 (1954)
(describing the structural mechanisms that tie Congress to the states).
83. See Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, supra note 59,
at 279-80 ("For much of our history (from at least Thomas Jefferson's time until the late 1960s),
getting elected to federal office was simply impossible without the enthusiastic backing of state and
local party officials."); id. at 281-85 (explaining how political parties have continued to be essential to
national politics since the 1960s).
84. Prior to 1842, states commonly selected their congressional delegations on a statewide basis, and
some states intermittently did so for many years thereafter. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1156-59 (2d ed. 2001); see also ANDREW
HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION -10 (1963); ROSEMARIE
ZAGARRI, THE POLmCS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1850 (1987); Tory Mast,
History of Single Member Districts for Congress (1999), available at http://www.fairvote.org/reports/
monopoly/mast.html (last visited May 8, 2004). A 1967 federal statute mandates single-member
geographical districts, 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (2000), and there is some evidence that Americans regard
winner-take-all elections for single-member districts as part of their constitutional heritage-and may
erroneously believe them to be constitutionally required as a literal matter as well. Cf Richard H. Pildes
& Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 241, 270 ("The
cumulative voting system apparently was met with contempt and disbelief by the general public.").
Under the influence of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000)), alternatives to winner-take-all elections for single-member
districts have been implemented at the state and local level. See Pildes & Donoghue, supra, at 259
("Unbeknownst to many, in recent years there has been a quiet proliferation of alternative voting
systems in the United States."). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will not require or
uphold aggressive enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 490-91
(2003) (holding that an electoral districting plan that does not maximize the number of districts in
which minority voters are in the majority is not, for that reason alone, retrogressive in violation of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). Accordingly, there appears to be little legal incentive for Americans
to give up their attachment to winner-take-all elections in single-member districts.
85. See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN
STATE 217 (Barbara North & Robert North trans., Wiley 2d English rev. ed. 1959) (1951) (observing
that the tendency of first-past-the-post electoral systems to produce two major political parties "ap-
proaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law"). Canada, for cultural and other reasons, is
an exception, as Duverger himself recognized. See id. at 223.
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advantages of affiliating with more-or-less like-minded voters in other states has
meant that throughout American history there have been two and only two
major national parties, each with a sufficiently broad ideological definition to
encompass substantial regional diversity. When third parties arose around issues
that the two major parties were not addressing, their agendas were quickly
appropriated by one or both of the major parties or, less commonly, the third
party eventually replaced one of the other two. 86 Though neither expressly
created nor recognized by the Constitution, the two-party system is nonetheless
a quasi-constitutional feature of our system of government-called into exis-
tence by the structures the Constitution does expressly create and recognize.
And what is the nature of our two-party system? Ralph Nader was wrong
when he said that there is no substantial difference between the Republican and
Democratic parties.87 Median voters do not typically become party activists,
and because candidates must appeal to activists to receive their party's nomina-
tion, the major parties do exhibit real differences.88 However, the need to appeal
to, or at least not to alienate, median voters in the general election means that
neither major party can afford to capitulate too clearly to activists whose agenda
would be regarded by mainstream voters as extreme.
The major American parties do, of course, provide a home for social groups
based on religion, race, and class. Most notably, Christian conservatives are a
vital Republican constituency while African-Americans and organized labor are
among the most loyal constituencies of the Democratic Party, even if union
leaders do not consistently deliver the rank and file. 89 But, despite providing
homes to interest groups, modem American umbrella parties facilitate rather
than impede the coalition-building game of The Federalist No. 10. Within the
86. The birth of the Republican Party and the death of the Whig Party on the eve of the Civil War is
the best-known example of the latter phenomenon. As to the former, there are numerous instances of
third parties coalescing around issues, moving them to the national agenda, and then fading. Most
recently, Ross Perot's Reform Party promoted deficit reduction and campaign finance reform, only to
fade after these issues were appropriated by the major parties.
87. In 2000, Nader referred to the two major parties collectively as "Republicrats," deliberately
mixing and matching the major party candidates' names as "Gush and Bore." Sam Howe Verhovek,
What Makes Ralph (and Pat) Run?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 4, at 5.
88. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitutional Order
and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 44 (1999) (citing MARTIN P.
WATrENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s, at
22-23 (1991)).
89. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Talk of Religion Provokes Amens as Well as Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2002, at A19 ("Mr. Bush's evangelical cadences appeal mightily to a core constituency, Christian
conservatives, particularly in a midterm election year."); Lynette Clemetson, Younger Blacks Tell
Democrats To Take Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at Al ("Democrats have traditionally counted on
more than 90 percent of the black vote."); Adam Clymer, Democrats Seek a Stronger Focus, and
Money, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A] ("Democrats are ... a coalition of interests, notably
African-Americans, labor, feminists and all-purpose liberals."); John Heilemann, The GOP Big Tent Is
Full of Holes, WIRED, Apr. 1996 ("In 1994, one in every three Republican votes was cast by a white
evangelical, with fully two in five coming from the broader category of self-described religious
conservatives, including Roman Catholics."), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.04/
netizen.html (last visited May 8, 2004).
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Republican Party, Christian conservatives make peace with the anti-tax agenda
of economic libertarians, just as the latter accept more conservative social
policies than they might otherwise favor. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party is
home to mainstream labor and environmental activists whose interests often
diverge-and even when their interests converge, as they sometimes do on trade
issues, they are often unable to steer the party.90
To be sure, Christian conservatives have recently had somewhat greater
success in controlling the Republican Party's social agenda,9 but that is a quite
recent and perhaps ephemeral phenomenon. In the 1990s, Republican governors
in the northeastern states of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York won
elections and governed as social liberals, suggesting that religious conservatism
has been a regional force more than a party force. Rapid sunbelt population
growth increased the national political power of social conservatives over the
last two decades by increasing congressional representation for Bible belt
politicians, but continued southward migration over the coming decades could
reverse the trend-if migrants to sprawling southern suburbs bring moderate
politics with them. That qualification is itself a large "if," however, because
there is evidence that people tend to migrate to places where they feel politically
comfortable.92 Accordingly, absent severe economic dislocations of the sort that
would induce large-scale migration across the political spectrum, in the medium
term, the politics of the American South are unlikely to become more liberal
due to migration.
The larger point, however, is that American political parties are, over the long
haul, hollow shells, vehicles for aggregating interests and trading off factions.
Their raison d'8tre is obtaining and holding power rather than advancing an
agenda. Though unanticipated by the Constitution's Framers, the party system
that their handiwork called into existence thus very much serves the constitu-
tional vision of The Federalist No. 10.
But, alas, it does so at the expense of the constitutional vision of The
Federalist No. 519 3-the classic statement of separation of powers as the
mechanism by which the Constitution prevents excessive concentration of
power. Professor Black was right that, in principle, Congress has a great many
90. For example, as a candidate for President, Bill Clinton strongly supported the North American
Free Trade Agreement, even as he also pledged to negotiate labor and environmental side agreements.
Once in office, his administration acceded to Mexican and Canadian demands that no additional labor
requirements be imposed by side agreement. See Kate E. Andrias, Gender, Work, and the NAFTA Labor
Side Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 521,538-40 (2003).
91. See, e.g., White House Press Release, President Speaks at 30th Annual March for Life on the
Mall (Jan. 22, 2003) (trumpeting President Bush's opposition to abortion, embryonic stem cell research,
and physician-assisted suicide), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/
20030122-3.html. As an example of the interconnectedness of the Christian right and the Republican
Party, note that Ralph Reed, the former director of the Christian Coalition, currently serves as chairman
of the Georgia Republican Party. See Bumiller, supra note 89.
92. See Jonathan Tilove, The New Map of American Politics, AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1999, at
34-35.
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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powers to check the President, but it can only use these successfully if members
of Congress believe that their first institutional loyalty is to the chamber in
which they serve, rather than to the party that funds and otherwise facilitates
their election. Except for the rare member of Congress who can raise money
independently of his party, such institutional loyalty at the expense of party
loyalty seems extremely unlikely.
IV. THE STRUCTURAL METHOD IN ACTION: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
My analysis to this point has been inspired by Charles Black in the sense of
looking beyond the Constitution's text to concrete institutions, but I have not
yet applied the structural method as such. To do so would require drawing a
normative inference from the relationship of the institutions the Constitution
recognizes and calls into existence. In the current context, the inference seems
straightforward enough: If possible, we should find a way to reconcile the
Constitution's commitment to separation of powers-the possibility of an inde-
pendent-minded Congress-with its commitment to moderating the influence of
factions. Yet the political party system we have impedes the former commitment
while furthering the latter. How are we to choose between two competing
constitutional values? The analysis of the previous Part suggests that we should
look for the beginning of an answer in the constitutional and subconstitutional
law governing the electoral process.
Consider campaign finance regulations of the sort embodied by Section 323
of the Federal Election Campaign Act--enacted as the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"),9 4 and recently upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.95 The law has the purpose and effect, inter alia, of making it
more difficult for state and national political parties to raise money. Conven-
tional wisdom, as expressed most insistently by campaign finance regulation
opponents like Senator Mitch McConnell, holds that limiting the ability of
parties to raise money will weaken political parties, and thereby increase the
power of special interests, or to use the Madisonian lexicon, factions.9 6
Critics of campaign finance reform worry that the application of contribution
limits to party spending for individual candidates will free politicians from their
parties' fundraising machinery, and thereby weaken party discipline. Explaining
without formally endorsing the critics' concern, Professor Persily describes a
world of weakened parties in which campaigns funded by "wealthy interest
groups (unmediated by parties) ... lead to [the] narrowing of the policy agenda
to satisfy those interests. 97
94. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (Supp. 2003).
95. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 686 (2003).
96. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Senate Debates McCain's Bill on Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2001, at A 1.
97. See Nathaniel Persily, Parties, Money and Corruption, The Funding of Political Parties Work-
shop, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, July 5-6, 2002 (unpublished draft, on
file with author, at 22).
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Where campaign finance regulation's critics see restrictions on party fundrais-
ing and spending as playing into the hands of well-heeled special interests,
however, optimists like Professor Briffault see BCRA as simultaneously serving
the public and the long-term interests of the parties by weaning the latter from
their dependence on large donors and connecting them to the grass roots.9 8 In
this view, BCRA's continued reliance on private money to fund campaigns
avoids the problem most closely associated with public finance-that of sever-
ing the link between the party and its members99-while at the same time
allowing parties to thrive. BCRA's "combination of a higher hard money ceiling
and continuing provision for the use of some soft money for voter mobiliza-
tion," Briffault writes, "should allow the parties to cover if not expand" their
electoral activities.'0o
In some sense, Briffault's response is a non sequitur. The main problem with
cutting the tie between large donors and the parties, according to the critics, is
not that parties will be starved for cash. The problem is that the large donors
will seek to spend their money outside the moderating, compromise-inducing
influence of the parties. As Professors Issacharoff and Karlan have argued, legal
restrictions on political contributions or expenditures do not eliminate the
demand for money in politics; they merely shift the locus of activity.'o
But what if they are wrong? What if the individuals and corporations that
donate to candidates and parties do so less for the purpose of buying favors,
than because they want to avoid being punished for failing to make sufficiently
large contributions? What if, in other words, we assimilate the corrupting
influence of money in national politics, not to the model of bribery, but to the
model of extortion? Representative Christopher Shays, one of the leading
advocates of campaign finance reform in the United States over the last decade,
has described the activities of politicians as a form of "shakedown," defined (in
response to a query from campaign finance reform opponent Representative
Tom DeLay) as a phenomenon in which "leaders from both parties will call up a
corporation president and say, 'We would like $100,000 or $200,000 or $300,000
or half a million,' and make it very clear to those leaders that they can expect no
action on their legislation unless they get it.' 0 2 Assuming such shakedowns do
occur, tightening restrictions on large donations will result in corporate donors
pocketing the money that they otherwise would have spent in response to
98. See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3
ELECTION L.J. 147, 174-75 (2004) (noting how BCRA promotes public participation).
99. See Keith D. Ewing, The Funding of Political Parties in Britain: What Is To Be Done?, The
Funding of Political Parties Workshop, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, July
5-6, 2002 (unpublished draft, on file with author).
100. Id. at 20.
101. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx.
L. REV. 1705 passim (1999). Although it upheld most of BCRA, in doing so the Court acknowledged
(without attribution) the hydraulic effect Issacharoff and Karlan identified. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at
706 ("Money, like water, will always find an outlet.").
102. Alison Mitchell, After Hours, Debate on Fund-Raising Rages, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1998, at A1.
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pressure from politicians. Some portion of the money in the political system
will not simply flow hydraulically to purchase influence upstream because those
funds were not in the system voluntarily. Thus, not every dollar diverted from
party coffers goes to independent expenditures that increase factionalism.
Neither, however, is it plausible to assume that all or even most corporate and
other large contributions are simply responses to politicians' demands. Undoubt-
edly, some substantial portion of such contributions are an attempt to purchase
influence, and banning the direct purchase of influence will lead those interested
in buying to seek substitute goods; in other words, such a ban will have the
hydraulic effect that Issacharoff and Karlan identify. We do not know the
precise proportions of money in the system that are attributable to pressure from
politicians and efforts to buy influence, respectively, nor is it even clear that
these are cleanly severable categories-sometimes it is impossible to distin-
guish between submitting to extortion and offering a bribe. My own suspicion,
albeit merely a hypothesis, is that shakedowns account for a relatively modest
fraction of money contributed, so that the hydraulic phenomenon is real and
substantial. More empirical information is needed to assess the hydraulics claim
fully, which is one reason why I might have advised the Court to uphold
BCRA-but only provisionally, to see whether its predicted effects material-
ized. ' 0
3
Another reason the Court was right to uphold BCRA is that the law's critics
may be right: it may have the effect of weakening the political parties. But if so,
it is hardly clear that this fact should count against BCRA in the constitutional
analysis. If I am right that the political party system-and, in particular, the
dependence of members of Congress on their parties' fundraising apparatuses-
encourages loyalty to party over loyalty to Congress, then weakening the parties
could have the salutary effect of strengthening loyalty to Congress. Campaign
finance reform increases the likelihood that Congress will stand up to the
imperial Presidency.
But in thus serving the separation-of-powers values associated with The
Federalist No. 51, does campaign finance reform, by weakening the two-party
system, lead in equal and opposite measure to the undermining of the anti-
factionalist values associated with The Federalist No. 10? And, if so, how
should the Court choose between these constitutional values? I do not pretend to
have the answer to that last question, though I do have two further observations.
First, the Court's opinion upholding BCRA, in finding that the attenuated free
speech right to make campaign contributions can be justifiably overridden in an
effort to limit corruption or the appearance of corruption, stops short of address-
ing the fundamental questions. I do not disagree with the Court's analysis as a
matter of free speech law, narrowly understood. But campaign finance regula-
103. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Foreword: The Limits of So-
cratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61-69 (1998) (describing and advocating "provisional
adjudication").
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tion is not exclusively-or even primarily-a matter of free speech. It is a
matter of democracy writ large, and any persuasive account of why Congress
can or cannot regulate campaign finance should accordingly be underwritten by
an account of the place of money in our constitutional democracy.
Second, to the extent that the Court has, in other cases involving the political
process itself, taken a stand on basic principles of democracy, the view the
Court has seemingly endorsed is problematic. In particular, the Court's fear for
the stability of our political system is overblown. One sees such fear in cases
holding that the preservation of the two-party system is a valuable constitutional
objective in its own right.'0° Professor Pildes has argued that this view is part of
a broader worry on the Court's part that, absent judicial vigilance, the political
system might become unstable; it is this concern with stability, he suggests, that
also underwrote the Court's willingness to intervene in the 2000 Presidential
election. 105 Professor Pildes suggests-and I tend to agree-that the fear is
largely misplaced and that American democracy would benefit were it more
tumultuous. 106 Opening up the two-party system to greater political competition
need not place us on a slippery slope to the multi-party chaos of Weimar
Germany. As Professors Issacharoff and Pildes explain by contrasting American
and German constitutional doctrine, any number of handholds can be found to
brake that descent.' 0 7 Given geographic districts and winner-take-all elections,
Duverger's Law already gives the two-party system a huge institutional advan-
tage. Thus, in a close case, the fact that a measure strengthens the two-party
system ought to count against it, rather than for it. And, conversely, the fact that
a measure such as BCRA may weaken the two-party system ought not to count
against it and might even count in its favor.
That is the upshot of my Blackian analysis. Examination of the institutional
advantages our constitutional system gives to the two-party system suggests that
this system can still play its faction-frustrating role, even if somewhat weakened
by a regime of campaign finance reform that has the effect of making politicians
somewhat less dependent on their parties' fundraising apparatuses. Perhaps I am
wrong in that assessment, or perhaps making members of Congress less depen-
dent on their parties will render them a collection of loose cannons, rather than
shifting their loyalty from party to Congress as an institution. But, whatever the
104. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 579 (2000) (fearing California's blanket
primary might lead to the destruction of a major political party); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-66 (1997) (validating the government interest in preventing "the destabilizing
effects of party-splintering").
105. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695 passim (2001).
106. See id. at 717-18.
107. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 690-99 (1998). For example, a requirement that a minor
party receive some substantial level of support before becoming eligible for judicial protection against
oligopolistic practices by the major parties prevents unlimited proliferation of small parties. See id. at
692 (describing German legal requirement that a party receive at least five percent of the vote to attain
representation in parliament and other bodies).
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right answer, here as elsewhere, Black's structural method quite clearly focuses
us on the right question-what will be the impact of campaign finance reform
on the institutions of our democracy? That is more than can be said for the
Court's efforts over nearly three decades to distinguish between campaign
expenditures and campaign contributions on the grounds that the former are
speech protected by the First Amendment, while the latter are (within limits)
not. 108
CONCLUSION
To return to the question of congressional independence from the President,
we should not kid ourselves that adjustments to judicial doctrine governing the
rules of campaign finance will convert every member of Congress into a Robert
Byrd.'0 9 On some matters, the combination of party loyalty and institutional
timidity relative to the Executive appear to inhere in modem small-r republican
government, across a wide range of institutional arrangements. How else to
explain the ability of Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi, and Jose Maria Aznar to
commit their countries to the U.S.-led war on Iraq in 2003, despite widespread
public opposition?"' o
The fact that Congress will rarely insist on checking the President's de facto
war making power is troubling, and it may lead us to try to retrofit a solution
onto the Constitution. The War Powers Resolution of 1973111 was one such
effort, but it does not change the basic dilemma Congress faces. Members of
Congress do not want to have to take the heat for a war that goes badly, so they
rarely resort to a formal declaration of war. But the President's powers as
Commander in Chief permit him-and in some circumstances obligate him-to
commit forces without prior congressional approval,"12 and once troops are
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) ("In summary, we sustain the individual
contribution limits [but] conclude ... that the limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent
expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are
constitutionally infirm.").
109. Senator Byrd defends Senate prerogatives against Presidential encroachment, even if they come
from Democratic Presidents. See, e.g., Steven J. Duffield & James C. Ho, Comment, The (Still) Illegal
Appointment of Bill Lann Lee, 3 Thx. REV. L. & POL. 403, 405 & n. 10 (1999) (citing letter from Byrd to
Attorney General Janet Reno, and on file with authors, demanding "an explanation and analysis of the
President's authority to install Lee without Senate confirmation").
110. See The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, The Pew Global Attitudes Project,
America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties (Mar. 18, 2003) (showing opinion
running against the war in Britain, Italy, and Spain by respective margins of fifty-one to thirty-nine
percent, eighty-one to seventeen percent, and eighty-one to thirteen percent), available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/175.pdf. The question is especially interesting because it simultaneously shows
the weakness of opposition to executive power over national defense and the limits of public choice
theory. If politicians cared about nothing other than re-election or the good of their parties, then these
men would not have taken such unpopular stands.
111. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
112. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) ("If a war be made by invasion of a
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
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engaged in combat, members of Congress are loathe to bring them home lest
their action be seen as unpatriotic. Thus, Congress has a built-in incentive to sit
on the fence.
Does this mean that we are entirely dependent on the wisdom and judgment
of the President to protect us from misguided presidential policies, including
military adventures? I think not. Perhaps we can rely somewhat upon the
President's own incentives. A first-term President cares about re-election and a
second-term President cares about his legacy. Accordingly, Presidents respond
to political pressure, even (perhaps especially) in matters of war and peace. In
this context, recall White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card's explanation for
waiting until the Fall of 2002 to make the public argument for confronting
Saddam Hussein with military force: "From a marketing point of view," he
explained, "you don't introduce new products in August."' 
13
I argued in Part II of this essay that for the structural method to be an
acceptable mode of judicial interpretation of the Constitution, it must be con-
nected to textual interpretation. I would conclude by positing a parallel point
outside the domain of judicial enforcement of the Constitution: Analysis of the
institutional incentives of constitutional actors is incomplete without connecting
that analysis to the actors' legal powers. Thus, textual analysis of the Constitu-
tion shows, as Professor Black argued," 14 that Congress has the tools to rein in
the imperial Presidency. Institutional analysis shows why Congress is unlikely
to use those tools especially often or effectively.
authority."). The President's unilateral power would grow still further should his claimed right to treat
potential military threats as justifying preemptive action go unchallenged. See The National Security
Strategy of the United States 14 (Sept. 2002) ("We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies and friends."), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2004).
113. Elisabeth Bumiller, Traces of Terror: The Strategy; Bush Aides Set Strategy To Sell Policy on
Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 2002, at Al.
114. See BLACK, supra note I.
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